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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
May a Defendant be convicted for escape under section 76-8-309 when Defendant 
was on Parole status. 
Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the law when the court ruled that 
official custody means, that even one under the authority of the board of pardons, who is 
on parole, is in official custody even though the statute specifically excludes those on 
parole. 
Did the trial Court err by failing to instruct the jury on the issue of official custody 
as it is written in section 78-8-309(7)(b), over the objection of defense counsel. The court 
excised the words "or the prisoner is not on parole. 
Did the trial court err in failing to arraign Mr. Richardson on the charge against 
him. 
The standards of review are plain error on the defective jury instruction. A 
question of law on the issue of interpreting UCA section 76-8-309, and on the failure to 
arraign the defendant. The standard of review for a the conviction under the statute is 
legal correctness. 
Whether the trial court selected the correct legal definition to apply to the facts of 
a case presents a question of law. See C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 
47, 54 (Utah Ct.App. 1995V Legal correctness Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422 Utah, 1999. 
Correctness (of the statute) under article 1 section 11 Wood v. University of Utah Medical 
Center, 67 P.3d 436 Utah,2002. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitution of Utah Article 1 section 7 due process of law. 
Rule 10 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 11 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Section 76-8-309 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a conviction for escape under section 76-8-309 of the 
Utah Code. 
The defense raised the issue to the court below that Mr. Richardson could not be 
charged with escape since he was on parole at the time the charge of escape was brought 
against him. The court below ruled that even though the definition of "official custody" 
excluded parolees, Mr. Richardson never the less fell under the definition of "official 
custody". The trial court determined that the Half Way Back program was a place of 
confinement. Therefore, even though on parole the trial court determined as a matter of 
law that Mr. Richardson was subject to the escape statute (section 76-8-309). The 
defendant himself suggested to the trial court that the appropriate charge was one of 
absconding. (Index 109 transcript of trial page 65 lines 1-3). 
FACTS 
Wesley Ray Richardson was granted parole from the Utah State Prison. While on 
parole during 2004, the parole board and his parole officer placed him in the Half-Way 
Back program in Uintah County, Utah. The Half-Way Back program is operated out of 
the Uintah County jail. 
While in the program Mr. Richardson did not report back to the program as 
required on May 27, 2005. He subsequently contacted his parole officer by telephone on 
May 28th, 2005. Mr. Richardson was picked up in Salt Lake County on June 10th of 2005 
pursuant to a warrant from the board of pardons, (index 107,Transcript of Preliminary 
Hearing page 10 lines 1-18, index 109 Transcript of trial pages 20 lines 16-25 and 21 lines 
1-23). 
Uintah County charged Mr. Richardson with escape under section 76-8-309 Utah 
Code Annotated. At Preliminary Hearing his counsel objected to charge on the ba is that 
Mr. Richardson was on parole and not in official custody. (Index 107, Transcript of 
Preliminary page 1 lines 6-14). At trial the court issued its ruling that Mr. Richardson was 
confined in the state prison even though he was on parole, (index 109 Transcript of trial 
page 60 lines 19-24). 
Mr. Richardson was never arraigned on the charges against him. There is no 
reference to an arraignment in the transcript of preliminary hearing, nor in any of the 
minute entries prepared by the court clerk. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Mr. Richardson was denied due process of law when he was not bound 
over nor arraigned. 
Utah Constitution Article I section 7 provides "No person shall be deprived of 
Life, liberty or property without due process of law " 
Riggins v District Court of Salt Lake County, 51 P 2d 645 Utah 1935 reads in part 
11
 Due process of law requires that notice be given to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected It "hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment 
only after trial" It is difficult to believe that the Legislature intended to empower the court 
to find "that the material allegations of the petition or complaint are true" without giving 
the defendant an opportunity to be heard It is elementary that a court may not make 
findings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard An act 
which authorized a court to make findings binding upon a defendant without giving him an 
opportunity to be heard must fail 
Affirmatively cited for this proposition in, Pangea Technologies, Inc v Internet 
Promotions. Inc 2004 WL 1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004 
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that following the bind 
over by the magistrate, "the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court " 
In this case at preliminary hearing the defense objected to the charge of escape brought 
against the defendant since as a parolee the defendant was not properly charged (Index 
107 transcript of preliminary hearing pages page 3 lines 6-17) The trial court did not issue 
its ruling on the issue until the day of the trial (Index 109 Trial transcript September 15, 
2004, page 60 lines 13-24 {the correct date of the trial may be November 15, 2004) The 
written ruling on the issue is dated November 10, 2004 (Record pages 50 and 51) The 
record does not reflect that the defendant was either bound over nor arraigned at the 
preliminary hearing The preliminary hearing ended with the requirement that the parties 
hearing page 17 lines 12-24). There were no hearings between November 10 and trial, 
there is a minute entry of a hearing November 10, 2004, the minute entry reflects that Mr. 
Richardson was not present. (Record page 52). Mr. Richardson was not bound over nor 
arraigned on the date of the trial either. (Index 109 transcript of trial). Due process 
requires that following any bind over the defendant "shall forthwith be arraigned in the 
district court". (Rule 10 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). Utah Constitution Article I 
section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of Life, liberty or property without due 
process of law." The defendant is to be afforded an opportunity to be arraigned and plead 
unless he waives that opportunity. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
State v.Jensen, 83 Utah 452, 30 P2d 203 (1934). 
It is the burden of the defense to marshal the evidence in this instance to show the 
negative, to show that Mr. Richardson was not arraigned. It is the absence of any record 
of bind over or arraignment that is in place here. There appears in the record no bind over 
order oral or written, and there is no record of arraignment or even any hearing dates 
where the defendant was present, between the issuance of the written order and the 
commencement of the trial 5 days later. There appears in the record no other opportunity 
for an arraignment. 
The failure to bind the defendant over or to arraign him is reversible error. 
Point 2. The trial court erred in it interpretation of the law code section 
76-8-309 (escape). 
The trial court erred when it ruled that official custody means, that even one under 
the authority of the board of pardons, who is on parole, is in official custody or confined 
even though the statute specifically excludes those on parole. 
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive sentences — Definitions. 
(a) "Confinement" means the prisoner is: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a contract with the Utah 
Department of Corrections after being sentenced and committed and the sentence has not 
been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or housed in a county jail 
after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not been terminated or voided or 
the prisoner is not on parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(c) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or confinement in a 
state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of juvenile offenders, or any 
confinement pursuant to an order of the court or sentenced and committed and the 
sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is 
considered confined in the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from work release or home 
visit by the time designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, pursuant to a contract with 
the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by correctional officers. 
Herein the trial court chose to ignore the designation of parole status found under the 
"Confinement' subsection (a)(ii) and under the "Official custody" subsection (c). (Index 
pages 50 and 51 Ruling). (Index 109 transcript of trial page 60 lines 8-24). The trial court 
explains that it is troubled that persons in the halfway back program would feel free to 
escape any time they wanted to unless they are subject to a charge for escape. (Index 109 
trial transcript page 64 lines 19-22). When someone is on parole they are under the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. As such the Board of Pardons has its own authority 
to issue warrants, to require persons to complete programs such as the Half Way Back 
program, or counseling or whatever is appropriate in the estimation of the board. As such 
the board has authority to set its own sanctions when a parolee fails to comply with the 
requirements of parole. (Utah code annotated sections 77-27-let seq {sections 77-27-5 
Board of Pardons and Parole Authority, 77-27-6 Payment of restitution, 77-27-10 
Conditions of Parole, 77-27-11 Revocation of Parole, 77-27-13 Board of Pardons and 
Parole}). The statute relied on for convicting Mr. Richardson recognizes the jurisdiction 
of the Board of Pardons and Parole over parolees. As shown in the above quotations of 
the statue the legislature provides a specific limitation on the subsections for both 
"Confinement" and for "Official Custody" where the offender has been granted parole by 
the Board. The further evidence that the legislature intended to leave the jurisdiction of 
parolees to the Board of Pardons and Parole is the repeal of Utah Code Section 76-8-
309.5. That section "Absconding" did make a separate crime for those on parole, it was a 
third degree felony as is escape. At the time Mr. Richardson is accused of not returning to 
the Half Way Back program he was under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole. At trial the first person to testify was Parole Officer James Murray. He testified 
that Wesley Richarson was on parole to him. (Record 109 trial transcript page 9 lines 1-
25) Mr. Murray also testified that the Halfway Back Program is ".. .a program that we use 
in parole whne we may have violations of parole, such as drinking ..." (Record 109 trial 
transcript page 10 lines 1-14). (See also trial exhibit 1 "State of Utah Board of Pardons 
and Parole Halfway Back Program Waiver of Appearance, copy at addendum). His failure 
to return is an issue exclusively for the Board of Pardons and Parole. The trial court's 
interpretation of the escape should be given no deference. The interpretation of the 
statute is in error. The trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
Point 3, Did the Court err in excising one of the elements of the crime from the 
instruction to the jury. 
The court misstated the law injury instjuctions 4 and 5 (Record pages 77 and 76). 
Instruction number 5 reads '"Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without 
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of juvenile 
offender, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or sentenced and 
committed and the sentence has not been terminated or voided.' This instruction follows 
the statute word for word until the last sentence. Where the trial court has put a period 
after the word voided, the statute continues with the words; "or the prisoner is not on 
parole." (Utah Code Annotated section 76-8-309 (7)(b)). By so doing the jury was 
mislead as to the status of Mr. Richardson and miss-instructed as to the meaning of official 
custody. Without an erroneous instruction regarding "official custody" the jury is mislead 
as to the facts it is charged to find. An essential element is left out of the trial, 
deliberations and conviction. 
Because of the improper instruction on "official custody" then the jury is mislead 
as to the elements of the crime as listed in instruction number 4. (Record page 77). The 
instruction must include a finding that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Richardson was not on parole at the time the offense is alleged. That essential element of 
the crime nowhere included in instruction number 4. 
Whether a jury instruction correctly state the law is a question of law. The courts 
review that for correctness. The courts have required an objection to the instruction, 
unless the defendant can demonstrate three things. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 Utah, 
1993 provides: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an 
alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following, (i) 
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our *1209 confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. [FN3] See State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. Bell 770 
P.2dl00, 105-06 (Utah 1988). 
Here Mr. Richardson's attorney did object to the trial court's failure to consider the issue 
of whether Mr. Richardson was on parolee at the time of the alleged offense. (Record 107 
transcript of preliminary hearing page 17 lines 17-23). His attorney next noted the 
objection at the trial when the jury instructions were being finalized. (Record 109 
transcript of trial page 60 lines 7-24). Mr. Richardson himself is allowed to express his 
dissatisfaction with the instruction and the court responds explaining his ruling. The trial 
transcript of the exchange between the trial court and Mr. Richardson reads: 
"The Court: Need a — yeah, four. I'll instruct the jury, and then Counsel can give closing 
argument. Now, is there something you wanted to say? Do you want to talk to Beaslin a 
minute and say it through him, that's fine. Mr. Richardson: Well, my thing is as the law 
reads, it's someone not on parole, but the heading below there in big bold letters is for 
inmates on inmate status. The Board of Pardons would know more than anybody whether 
I'm on parole or not. Not the Court or anyone else. That's for people that get home visits 
and are on like road crews, is what that is. So they are not on parole status. They are on 
inmate status. Therefore, they are escaped. That's why it says parolees can't escape. The 
Court: Okay. You need to understand, though, if I read this the way you're wanting me to 
read it, anyone who might be on parole in the Halfway Back would feel free to escape any 
time they wanted. Mr. Beaslin: This is going to be something the Court of Appeals will 
have to refer now, because ~ Mr. Richardson: Because I know I've read the Oxford Law 
Book, and I've got several cases quoted back there, but wasn't allowed to use it. No one 
has ever been convicted under them circumstances. They had the absconded — The Court: 
You might be the first. Mr Richardson: They had the ab — well, I would be, but they had 
the absonia laws, and that's what Adult Probation and Parole, because I didn't violate the 
law in Uintah County, because I didn't escape out of the jail. The Court: Well, that's the 
issue. That's the issue; and I've ruled that you did, so you're going to have to talk to the 
Court of Appeals about it. (Record 107 trial transcript page 64 lines 6-25 and page 65 
lines 1-11). 
The issue resumes at page 66 of the transcript line 5 as follows: 
Mr. Richardson: I mean, even my caseworker at the prison is going "What is going on?" 
because no one in prison has been convicted of escape when they're on parole status. 
Even in the halfway house or Halfway Back, because they're on resident status, not inmate 
status. The Court: Maybe the Court of Appeals will agree with you, but I — the way I see 
it is this is where we are. (Record 107 transcript of trial page 66 lines 5-11). 
The word objection is not used by either Mr. Richardson nor his attorney Mr. Beaslin. Yet 
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the interchange is clear that the jury instructions are being objected to. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that a claim of error may be reviewed even if there 
has been no objection in "exceptional circumstances". 
We note that a claim of error also may be revived despite the lack of a contemporaneous 
objection if "exceptional circumstances" exist. See State v. Verde. 110 P.2d 116, 122 
(Utah 1989); State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988). 
Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is a question law which is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Jones, 878 P.2d 1175 Utah App.,1994. Counsel would 
note here that there are three cases addressing this issue that have not been finalized for 
publication as of the date of this brief They are: State v. Weaver, — P.3d -—, 2005 WL 
1845602, 2005 UT 49, Utah, Aug 05, 2005, Lee v. Langlev, — P.3d — , 2005 WL 
1831115, 2005 UT App 339, Utah App., Aug 04, 2005 and 3. State v. Cruz, — P.3d — , 
2005 WL 1705752, 530 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 2005 UT 45, Utah, Jul 22, 2005 
Here jury instructions 4 and 5 had really been objected to from the outset of the 
case as can be seen from the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The same issues were 
raised both by defense counsel and by the defendant before the instructions were read to 
thejury. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides at subpart e that an 
instruction may be assigned error in order to avoid manifest injustice. Subsection (e) reads 
in part; "Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid manifest injustice." State v. 
Lesley, 672 P2d 79 (Utah 1983). The Supreme Court has ruled that manifest injustice 
cannot be raised if the defendant invited the error. State v. Geukgeuzian, 86 P.3d 742 
Utah,2004. There appears no evidence in the record that Mr. Richardson or his counsel 
Ik 
invited the erroneous instruction by the trial court. To the contrary the issue was dealt 
with to the point that it was agreed it was an issue for the Court of Appeals. (Record 109 
trial transcript page 64 lines 23 and 23 and page 66 lines 10-11). 
The case law also provides that even if there is error in the jury instructions a new 
trial will not be granted unless the trial court's error mislead the jury. 
"However, "[a] new trial will not be granted unless any error of the trial court was 
prejudicial, meaning that it misadvised or misled the jury on the law." Id. Jury instructions 
are examined in their entirety, thus we " 'will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole 
fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.'" Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande 
W. R.R.. 2001 UT 77^ 38, 31 P.3d 557". as cited by Paulos v. Covenant Transport. Inc. 
86 P.3d 752 Utah App.,2004. 
Instructions 4 and 5 misstate the law. Instruction 5 actually misquotes the law as 
well. Therefore, the conviction should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant herein seeks a ruling from this Court reversing his conviction for 
Escape. Dismissing the case or remanding it for further proceedings as may be 
appropriate. Such other and further relief as is just and appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted t h i ^ ^ d a y ofAtf§tisJ< 
Cleve Hatch/Attorney for 
the Defendant/Appellant 
/ / 
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ADDENDUM 
Jury Instruction Number 4 
Jury Instruction Number 5 
State v. Jensen, 83 Utah 452, 30 P. 2d 203, Utah 1934, May 10, 2004 
States trial exhibit 1 "State of Utah Board of Pardons and Parole Halfway Back Program 
Waiver of Personal Appearance. 
ADDENDUM 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER T 
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, 
the State must prove certain essential facts which the statutes 
of this State define as being necessary elements constituting the 
crime charged. In the case now before the Court, proof of the 
commission of the crime of ESCAPE as charged in the Information 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the 
following: 
1. That on or between May 27, 2004 and May 28, 2 004; 
2. In Uintah County, State of Utah; 
3. The Defendant Wesley Ray Richardson 
4. Did knowingly, intentionally or recklessly leave 
official custody without lawful authorization. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER *> 
"Official custody'' means arrest, whether with or without 
warrant, or confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for 
secure confinement of juvenile offenders, or any confinement 
pursuant to an order of the court or sentenced and committed and 
the sentence has not been terminated or voided. 
State v. Jensen 
83 Utah 452, 30 P.2d 203 
Utah 1934. 
May 10, 1934 (Approx. 2 pages) 
83 Utah 452, 30 P.2d 203 





May 10, 1934. 
Appeal from District Court, Sevier County; N. J. Bates, Judge. 
Orlando Jensen was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals. 
Verdict and sentence annulled, and cause remanded. 
West Headnotes 
KeyCite Notes 
110 Criminal Law 
110XIV Arraignment 
110k261 Necessity of Arraignment and Plea 
110k261(2) k. Further Arraignment and Plea. Most Cited Cases 
Where information attempting to charge grand larceny charged no offense until after trial 
amendment, court erred in not arraigning defendant and granting requested time to plead. 
Rev.St.1933, 103-36-1, 105-17-3, 105-22-15. 
KeyCite Notes 
110 Criminal Law 
110XIX Continuance 
110k588 Grounds for Continuance 
110k599 k. Surprise at Trial. Most Cited Cases 
After plea is taken to information which charged offense only after amendment, court may 
on demand and proper showing grant reasonable time to defendant to prepare for trial. 
Rev.St.1933, 105-22-15. 
KeyCite Notes 
210 Indictment and Information 
210X1 Amendment 
21 Ok 161 Information 
210kl61(5) k. Accusation in General. MosttCited Cases 
Where information attempting to charge grand larceny was fatally defective because 
charging taking property only from possession of named person, amendment charging 
ownership of such person was proper. Rev.St.1933, 103-36-1, 105-17-3. 
KeyCite Notes 
234 Larceny 
234H Prosecution and Punishment 
23411(A) Indictment and Information 
234k32 Ownership of Property 
234k32(2) k. Necessity of Alleging Ownership. Most Cited Cases 
Information must directly allege that some person other than defendant owned property 
alleged to have been stolen to charge crime of grand larceny. Rev. St. 1933, 103-36-1. 
*203 J. Vernon Erickson, of Richfield, for appellant. 
Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., for the State. 
FOLLAND, Justice. 
From a verdict of conviction and sentence for the crime of grand larceny defendant 
appeals. The district attorney filed an information charging defendant and another as 
follows: "That the said Orlando Jensen and Hans Jensen, on or about the 8th day of 
August, A. D. 1932, at and within the County of Sevier, State of Utah, did willfully, 
unlawfully and feloniously, steal, take, lead, carry and drive away personal property from 
the possession of Lester Jensen, against the will and without the consent of the said Lester 
Jensen, the following described personal property, to-wit: 1 calf; contrary to the form of 
the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State 
of Utah." 
To this information both defendants pleaded not guilty. They requested and were given 
separate trials. After a jury was impaneled and a witness sworn, defendants' attorney 
objected to the introduction of any evidence on the ground the information failed to state 
facts sufficient to constitute a felony or any public offense in that it failed to allege 
ownership of the property alleged to have been stolen. The district attorney thereupon, 
and before ruling by the court, asked leave of court to amend the information, which leave 
was granted over objection by defendants. The information was amended to charge that 
defendants "did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, steal, take, lead, carry and drive away 
the personal property of Lester Jensen," etc. 
After amendment defendant moved for a continuance of the case until next term of court 
because "defendant was not prepared for trial at this time." This motion was denied, and 
defendant then asked for 24 hours' time in which to plead to the amended information. The 
court stated the statute authorized the court to grant such reasonable time as might be 
necessary for defendant to meet the new matter in the information, but he said, "I hardly 
think it implies the necessity for a new case." The court directed the plea already *204 
entered to stand as to the amended information and denied the motion for time to plead. 
No showing was made or reason given why the trial should not proceed forthwith, other 
than as above set forth. 
As grounds for reversal appellant argues the court erred: (1) In permitting the amendment 
to the information after plea; (2) in denying to defendant time within which to plead to the 
amended information; and (3) denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 
[1][2] The information as originally filed was fatally defective, in that it did not allege 
ownership of the property taken. This is an essential element o^the crime of grand larceny 
as defined by statute. R. S. Utah 1933, § 103-36-1. It was therefore necessary, in order to 
charge such crime, that the information contain an averment that the prope; iy, alleged to 
have been stolen, belonged to some one other than the defendant, and to directly allege 
such ownership. 17 R. C. L. 60; 2 Wharton Cr. Pr. (10th Ed.) 1212; 2 Wharton Cr. Law 
(12th Ed.) 1535, 1491. Ownership must be alleged directly and not by way of inference. It 
is not sufficient to merely charge the property was taken "from the possession of another. 
36 C. J. 831; State v. Ellis, 119 Mo. 437, 24 S. W. 1017; Maddox v. State 14 Tex. App. 
447, Hughes v. State, 74 Miss 368, 20 So. 838; People v. Hanselman, 76 Cal. 460, 18 P. 
425, 9 Am. St. Rep. 238. While the amendment was one of substance it did not change the 
nature of the crime involved. The district attorney, by the original information, intended to 
charge grand larceny, and it is grand larceny which is charged in the amend "d information. 
The amendment was germane to the offense charged in the complaint filed before the 
magistrate wherein the element of ownership of the property in Lester Jensen was properly 
alleged. It is not now contended that the amended information charged a different or other 
offense than the one on which defendant was bound over to the district coirt by the 
committing magistrate. Such an amendment, by leave of court, is authorize * by statute. R. 
S. Utah 1933, § 105-17-3; State v. Broeder, 90 Mo. App. 156 
[3] [4] After the information was amended to charge, for the first time, the crime of grand 
larceny, the court should have arraigned the defendant and granted him time to plead, as 
he did not waive such right, but demanded the time granted him by statute. Where an 
information is amended so as to state for the first time a public offense, it is the equivalent 
of a new information requiring arraignment of defendant and his plea thereto. Otherwise 
no issue is joined. 16 C. I 389; 31 C. J. 828; 14 R. C. L. 193; Bohannan v. State, 11 Okl. 
Cr. 69, 142 P. 1092; McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N. W. 741, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
714, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1034; State v. Kusel, 29 Wyo. 287, 213 P. 367; People v. Moody, 
69 Cal. 184, 10 P. 392. There is in the statute authorizing amendments after plea or during 
trial (R. S. Utah 1933, § 105-17-3) no specific requirement for arraignment or plea after 
amendment in matter of substance, neither is there any language which requires or permits 
the court to disregard the plain mandate of other provisions of the statute providing for 
arraignment and plea and granting to a defendant at least 24 hours1 time after being 
confronted with the charge against him within which to plead thereto. R. S. Utah 1933, § 
105-22-15. 
After the plea is taken, the court, on demand and showing, may then grant a reasonable 
time to the defendant in which to prepare for trial or meet the new matter in the new or 
amended information, pursuant to provisions qf R. S. Utah 1933, § 105-22-15. This 
decision is limited to a situation where the original information failed to state a public 
offense and on amendment after plea or during trial states for the first time a public 
offense. That is the only case before us. 
Under statutes similar to ours, formal or certain substantial amendments may be made 
after plea or during trial without requiring arraignment and new plea. State v. Rickenbcrg, 
58 Utah. 270. 198 P. 767; Collins v. People. 69 Colo. 353, 1"5 P. 525; Davis v. State. 4 
Okl. Cr. 508. 113 P. 220; State v. Walton. 255 Mo. 232. 164 S. W. 211; People v. Arnest 
(Cal. App,)23 P. (2d) 812; Rich v. State. 46 Okl. Cr. 242. 284 P. 903. 
The verdict and sentence are set aside and annulled, and the cause remanded to the district 
court of Sevier county for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein 
expressed. 
STRAUP, C. J., and ELIAS HANSEN, EPHRAIM HANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., 
concur. 
Utah 1934. 
STATE v. JENSEN. 
83 Utah 452, 30 P.2d 203 
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STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
HALFWAY BACK PROGRAM 
WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE 
I, Wesley Richardson, USP# 174095 understand I have the right to appear before the 
Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole with regard to modifications of my parole terms 
or special conditions of my Parole Agreement. I hereby waive my right to a personal 
appearance before the Board and request that my Parole Agreement be amended to add or 
modify the following condition(s) or term(s) of Parole as outlined below. I do so 
voluntarily and without duress or coercion. 
I agree to enter and successfully complete the Halfway Back program at the Uintah 
County Jail in Lieu of immediate return to the Utah State Prison. I understand I will 
serve an indeterminate period of time in the Uintah County Jail and will be subject to all 
rules and regulations of the facility. In addition, I understand that violation of the rules of 
the jail may result in my return to the Utah State Prison. 
I understand that I am financially responsible for any significant medical costs. 
1) That I will Successfully complete the Halfway Back Program at the Uintah 
County Jail, and comply with all rules and regulations of the Uintah County 
Jail. 
2) I will serve 90 days at the Uintah County Jail in the Halfway Back Program. 
3) Take Anta Buse if prescribed by a physician. 
By signing this Waiver, I acknowledge that I have not complied with my Parole 
Agreement and parole revocation proceeding could be initiated against me base 1 on my 
non-compliance. This Waiver shall be implemented immediately and will be submitted 
to the Board of Pardons for approval within four (4) days. 
I acknowledge there is no disability that would prevent me from complying with any 
special conditions ordered by the Board of Pardons and Parole including restitution. 
ltness 
Date 
